This week US President Donald Trump appeared to give his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin a two-week deadline to come to the negotiating table in good faith. When asked about ceasefire negotiations, Trump said: “Within two weeks. We’re gonna find out whether or not (Putin is) tapping us along or not. And if he is, we’ll respond a little bit differently.” But can the US or the West really expect a change of tack from the Kremlin?

Western officials are speculating that Moscow’s high equipment and personnel losses might finally induce Putin to accept a deal. Yet, that is not to say that Russia’s troops would also be persuaded. Soldiers interviewed this month by the New York Times expressed a determination to keep fighting until they control all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

With Russia having only taken an extra 0.6% of Ukrainian land over the past year, those men are unlikely to be reaching those borders any time soon. As another sign of soldiers’ inflated and confused expectations, last month only 18% of Moscow’s career military personnel said they would support peace without Russia having first achieved the goals of the invasion. The only trouble? They shared no consensus on what those goals actually are.

One could argue that, in a society as repressive as Russia, the leadership need not concern itself with the views of its soldiers. However, it is concerned. In July, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko informed regional vice-governors that the Kremlin considers returning veterans to be “the main factor of political and social risks”. He confessed that convicts-turned-soldiers have already committed robbery, rape and murder after returning to civilian life, while officials worry that even those without criminal records may struggle in peacetime and so drift into criminal gangs.

The Kremlin may have to suppress waves of not only crime but domestic unrest. Troops interviewed by the NYT revealed bitterness towards superiors for their corruption, resentment towards civilians for their hedonistic lives, and resolve that their own sacrifices must be compensated by concrete gains for Russia. On the other side, Kiriyenko acknowledged that, since the majority of the population has been protected from the harsh realities of war, “society is not ready to understand and accept” veterans. He added that ex-servicemen’s association with violent crime risks inciting civilians’ “aggression towards all military personnel”.

Moscow is a victim of its own policies. After the government elevated soldiers to hero status to encourage enlistment, veterans expect to be heard in peacetime society. Frontline resentment towards the pampered and protected could not have happened without the Kremlin sheltering elites from the impact of the war to prevent them suffering and, in turn, protesting. Moscow’s maximalist demands have raised soldiers’ hopes.

Most importantly, the public has consistently been told that this is an existential battle against a “Nazi” regime and expansionist West. How does it climb down from a task that is incomplete yet was allegedly so vital to Russia’s survival that it was worth sacrificing hundreds of thousands of lives? Unsurprisingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin is in no hurry to sign an agreement that could bring him a mob, many of whom may be embittered that they lost their compatriots, their youth and, nearly, their lives for the sake of a “botched” settlement.

So how is Putin stopping his “heroes” becoming his villains? Ex-soldiers claiming to speak for their men could become appealing challengers for his throne, with ready-built constituencies of supporters, and it would be controversial to publicly repress them in the way the Kremlin has other oppositionists. Therefore, Russia has quietly quashed grassroots veterans’ organisations for fear they could become sites of activism. It has striven to co-opt ambitious returnees, offering a few carefully selected ex-servicemen high-profile jobs and Duma places. Milbloggers are being brought under control to stop them stirring up criticism. Meanwhile, state media will need to focus on the benefits of any deal, not to mention the joyful human interest stories of families grateful for the agreement — and the president — that reunited them.

The only terms Putin will accept are those he can sell to his people. That means he would rather try to grind his way to the limits of those four regions than concede now, as ending one war risks sparking another on the home front.

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Bethany Elliott is a writer specialising in Russia and Eastern Europe.

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